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Can CCS and NET enable the continued use of fossil carbon fuels after CoP21? 
 
Stuart Haszeldine* 
 
Abstract: Carbon capture and storage (CCS) does not generate energy. CCS applied to 
fossil and modern bio-carbon fuels and feedstocks removes environmentally damaging 
CO2 emissions. CoP21 stipulated a maximum 2°C–1.5°C global warming from 2050 in 
perpetuity. Both CCS and negative emission technology (NET) are now required to 
manage the carbon stock in earth’s atmosphere and oceans. All components of CCS are 
operationally proven secure at the industrial scale. Fifteen CCS projects operate 
globally; seven are under construction. CCS systems increase electricity prices, to about 
£100/MWhr. CCS on industry is cheaper and storage costs minimal (£5–20/tonne). CCS 
reduces whole economy costs of carbon transition by 2.5 times. Policies of capex 
subsidy, oversupplied emissions certificates, weak carbon pricing, and weak emissions 
standards have all failed to develop large cost CCS mega-projects. New carbon 
certificates could link the extraction of carbon to an obligation to store a percentage of 
emissions. Certificates connect CCS and NET pathways to secure carbon storage for the 
public good. 
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I. Introduction: what is CCS?  
 
The use of energy stored in fossil fuels and carbon feedstock has been the basis of great 
human wealth since the European industrial revolution, and cannot rapidly be replaced. 
Combustion or conversion of the energy held stored in fossil and bio-hydrogen and 
carbon will continue to be a central plank of energy and products provision to 2030 and 
likely well beyond 2050 (IEA, 2015). Carbon capture and storage (CCS) equipment 
fitted on to power plant or concentrated industrial point sources offers a technological 
method by which the energy and commercial value from fossil fuel energy and carbon 
feedstocks (including limestone and biomass) can continue to be used with greatly 
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decreased impact from emissions of greenhouse gases (Haszeldine, 2009). CoP21 1 
agreed a ‘net-zero’ carbon economy from 2050. CCS has two roles, first to reduce 
emissions and second to re-capture already emitted carbon dioxide (CO2). In the first 
role, CCS is applied as effective engineering on to point sources of concentrated CO2. 
Here CCS is not restricted simply to electricity generation, but has impact in reducing 
emissions across the entire economy to include electricity, heat, industry, 
manufacturing, and transport. The construction of CCS is very slow (Scott et al., 2013). 
In its second role, to achieve ‘net-zero’, negative emission technologies (NET) are 
required in addition to CCS. These technologies are currently much less effective and 
are consequently more expensive. Thus fossil carbon can be recycled, via re-capture 
from air, to geological storage or product utilization. That can offset small but very 
numerous decentralized emissions, such as transport fuel; or partly offset industries 
which include many dispersed processes, such as refineries, or emissions escaping from 
CCS plant. NET can use equipment engineered as stand-alone Direct Air Capture; or as 
an adjunct to biomass industries (biochar, ethanol, ammonia); or CCS on thermal 
conversion (BECCS).  
 
This paper discusses the styles and options of CCS now and into the immediate future. 
This is a context in which to explore some of the much greater challenges for carbon 
budgets after CoP21 and then, lastly, examine several of the economic and policy 
options which have attempted to develop and deploy CCS. The paper also suggests a 
new carbon certificate option to include NET. 
 
 
 
II. What are CCS capture technologies? 
 
The application of CCS is frequently thought of as being restricted to electricity. 
However it is clear that, to achieve 90 per cent or greater net-zero decarbonization, CCS 
could become widespread. This can reduce emissions from electricity generation 
powered by gas or by coal, from heat, or from industrial emissions and process 
emissions. These are existing CCS systems, which create improvement by serial build, 
with cost-reductions by learning and efficiency improvements by innovation. Many 
NET, which are still at laboratory or first small pilot stage, also require CCS. 
 
There are three leading methods of CO2 separation from combustion gases at a fossil 
fuel power station. Boot-Handford et al. (2014) provide a thorough review in detail of 
the diversity of capture methods established and under development. A suite of videos 
and basic information is available at ZEP (2015a). 
 
                                                        
1 The 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris from 30 November to 12 December 
2015. 
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(i) Post-combustion capture from the hot gases after burning the fuel. This is 
conceptually the simplest, and the longest established, method of CO2 capture. 
Chemical solvents (nitroso-amines) selectively adsorb CO2 from the nitrogen 
and minor water, sulphur, and oxygen in flue gases. The solvent is heated in a 
different part of the plant, to drive off pure CO2 and recycle the solvent. This is 
already commercially applied to coal and to gas power plant by Cansolv. That 
has an energy penalty on power plant output of 18–25 per cent. Gradual 
improvement can be expected, but it is likely that new technologies currently in 
pilot testing will replace these solvents once commercially guaranteed. That 
could be within 10 years, and reduce energy and cost penalties to less than 10 
per cent. 
(ii) Oxycombustion burns the fuel in oxygen, which has previously been separated 
from air. The products are CO2 and water, which are easily separated by cooling 
to condense the water. Oxygen separation from air is a well proven mature 
process. Oxycombustion can be applied to gas, powdered coal, or biomass, and 
can be operated more flexibly, for variable power output, than traditional coal. 
This has never yet been built commercially, but has been the subject of the UK 
White Rose project and Future Gen in the USA. 
(iii) Pre-combustion capture, operates by gasifying a solid feedstock at 800°C 
(lignite, coal, refinery wastes, or biomass)—known as IGCC (Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle)—or by direct feed of syngas from underground 
gasification, or direct feed of natural gas. The fuel is chemically transformed to 
CH4, H2, and CO suitable for combustion, or for use as industrial chemical 
reagents in refineries. A variety of outputs are saleable: CO2 for enhanced oil 
recovery (EOR), feedstock H2, CH4 for urea or high-value chemicals, and even 
electricity. These processes are very well established in refining with long-
established expertise in USA, China, and South Africa. CO2 capture integration 
needs 3–15 times size scale-up. Efficiency losses can be only 10 per cent. 
 
 
 
III. Examples of CCS projects 
 
Multiple styles of CCS exist, and brief descriptions are given of successful capture-to-
storage operations. It is noticeable that most of these are fitted to low-cost industry 
capture, and are run by single lead developers—who are often oil companies with 
extensive expertise in gas handling. CCS costs in these cases are 50–30 per cent the cost 
of electricity CCS, making such ‘industry’ projects ideal learning vehicles. Low-cost 
entry points depend on local regional circumstances and can then act as nucleus projects 
for add-on CCS to rapidly reduce cost/tonne CO2. 
 
 
(i) Gas sweetening off(on)shore: Sleipner, In Salah, Snøhvit 
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These three sites are grouped because they provide the longest track-record of deliberate 
industrial scale CO2 injection for the purpose of climate mitigation. The need to 
‘sweeten’ methane gas accumulations is common, increasing, and worldwide. These 
types of projects reduce CO2 emissions at minimal extra cost, and are templates for what 
should be a mandated practice. From 1996 to 2010, these sites stored 16 Mt CO2, and 
now total about 24 Mt CO2 stored. These sites are linked by the source of CO2—being 
natural associated gas mixed with the extracted hydrocarbon. They are also linked by 
the simplicity of the projects: in each case the consortium owning and operating the 
hydrocarbon field has elected to store CO2 in a site geographically close to the 
commercial field. That reduces the business complexity of a project, and reduces the 
infrastructure and monitoring costs. The technological ease and feasible cost of 
operation of CO2 injection offshore is shown first by Cavanagh and Ringrose (2014), 
making a comparison with the established injection of 160 Bcf/yr methane at Åsgard 
North Sea gasfield, being the equivalent of 8 Mt/yr CO2. Second, Haszeldine (2015) 
shows that methane injection offshore in Magnus and Ula occurs at a similar scale and 
produces additional oil profitably. The required price is $70/tCO2 (£47) at $80 oil, rising 
to around $100 (£67) with a lesser oil price. 
 
In 1994 Norway signalled a tax on offshore CO2 emissions of €50/t CO2 (£37). This led 
to an immediate response from Statoil, fitting gas separation scrubbing on to condensate 
produced from Sleipner West, which contains about 9 per cent natural CO2. A semi-
detached link platform was built adjacent to the main production facility, to house the 
amine separation unit, and an additional borehole was drilled to inject 99 per cent pure 
CO2 into the Utsira sand at 1km depth adjacent to the platform. This has injected about 
1 MtCO2/yr without any abnormal incident since 1996 (Eiken et al., 2011). The CO2 
injection costs are £12/tonne. A similar project exists at In Salah, Algeria, where 3.8 
MtCO2 from associated gas was injected from 2004 to 2011 for $6/tCO2 (Ringrose et 
al., 2013). And offshore at the Snøhvit field in the Barents Sea some 2 Mt CO2 has been 
re-injected at less cost than the Norway emissions tax of €50/t CO2 (£37). 
 
 
(ii) CCS on coal power post-combustion: Boundary Dam  
 
Boundary Dam is a good example of strong project leadership, integrated management, 
and globally shared learning. Sask Power is the provincial dominant electricity supplier 
in Saskatchewan, and owns a 100–300-year supply of lignite adjacent to the power 
plant. Federal standards on power plant operational emissions performance and 
cumulative emissions are now in force (IEA-GHG, 2015). That created a strategic 
decision to invest in CCS and protect the local, reliable, low-cost fossil carbon from 
becoming a stranded asset. This project is a seminal example of a retrofit on to an 
existing coal/lignite combustion plant. Boundary Dam boiler unit BD3 of five was re-
powered during a 42-month programme (including winter downtime), by renewing the 
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130MW steam boiler, and at the same time installing amine CCS from Cansolv at a cost 
of $Can600m (Bassi et al., 2015). The 1 Mt/yrCO2 is sold by pipeline to nearby 
enhanced oil recovery at 30km distance and sulphuric acid and fly ash are also sold. The 
project over-ran cost from $Can1.2m to $Can1.4m and was 3 months late in final 
delivery. Operation from late 2014 was initially erratic, due to equipment suppliers 
failing to meet guarantees, but in late 2015 capture was operating as designed, with a 
very low overall 13 per cent efficiency penalty (IEA-GHG, 2015). The project received 
$Can240m of Federal support (about 20 per cent of capital cost), with no subsidy for 
operational costs. If borrowing rates were 5.9 per cent (internal borrowing), then the 
electricity price would be €142/MWhr (£104/MWhr) (Boyd, in Bassi et al., 2015). Note 
that many reports of Boundary Dam costs are inaccurate, because they combine the cost 
of boiler replacement and CCS fitting, whereas the CCS component was only half the 
total capex spend. These costs are all substantially less than in the UK, which can be 
explained by: (i) lower operating costs onshore in Canada; (ii) much more stringent UK 
safety and operating reliability construction requirements; and (iii) experienced 
Canadian management creating a cost-control system suitable for an engineering mega-
project and to liaise with multiple contractors. A very comprehensive report (IEA-GHG, 
2015) details pathways to cost reductions on the next boiler units, BD4 and BD5, to be 
retrofitted with CCS between 2027 and 2025. Sask Power persistently claims that these 
costs can be reduced by 30 per cent for a follow-on CCS construction at Boundary 
Dam—suggesting that a CCS electricity price of €95/MWhr (£70) is feasible in 
Saskatchewan.  
 
 
(iii) CCS on gas power post-combustion: Peterhead (Goldeneye) 
 
Gas fuel in 2011 supplied 22 per cent of European electricity, and is forecast to rise in 
all scenarios. The Peterhead project was planned to be the world’s first on a gas-fuelled 
power plant, and would be particularly important in Europe, to demonstrate CCS on 
power plant which could flex output around variable renewable energies. One-third of 
Peterhead with CCS would supply 400MW net power and send 1MtCO2/yr offshore to 
storage in the depleted Goldeneye gasfield. Re-use of the legacy 100km offshore 
pipeline, reconditioning offshore boreholes for CO2 injection, and re-purposing the 
existing offshore unstaffed platform should all have resulted in substantial savings of 
capital costs (but did not). The storage site was exceptionally well known because Shell 
had operated the gas extraction, and was resilient against leakage with three layers of 
sealing rock. Using Cansolv amine separation, and multiple integrations in the system 
design, the efficiency penalty would have been just 11–16 per cent (Assaf et al., 2014). 
A capital grant of about £400m was available in the UK commercialization competition, 
believed to cover about 50 per cent of capital, together with operational costs from the 
‘contract for difference’ feed-in-tariff in the UK electricity market covering the full 
additional costs of capture operations for a 10–15 year project life, at around £320m/yr. 
The generic learning would be made available globally. The process of competition 
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application was protracted, from December 2011 to December 2015, with an anticipated 
3-year construction. Multiple additional performance safeguards in the engineering 
specifications were required by government during the contract bidding, and substantial 
risk on finance, project performance, and liability had to be retained by the developers. 
Partly because of these over-design features, the cost of CCS electricity became greatly 
elevated, said to exceed £170/MWhr. Ironically, the high costs, partly required as a 
result of government specifications and risk aversion, were then used by government to 
define the project as uncompetitive and expensive, resulting in unilateral cancellation on 
25 November 2015, about 4 weeks before final Front End Engineering and Design 
(FEED) bids were to be submitted. 
 
 
(iv) Refinery hydrogen: vacuum swing, Port Arthur 
 
A fourth method of carbon capture is often forgotten, but is well suited to separation of 
process gases in industry. Vacuum swing—changing the adsorption of gas molecules 
into a physical material by changing the pressure—is operating routinely and 
unobtrusively in the Valero refinery plant in Texas. Air Products is the world’s largest 
industrial gas separator of hydrogen. This plant uses two vacuum swing adsorption 
units. The project captures at 97 per cent purity more than 90 per cent of the CO2 from 
the product stream of two commercial-scale steam methane reformers that would 
otherwise be emitted into the atmosphere. The plant is much smaller in size than the 
Cansolv-style amine equipment, and the power requirement is modest: 28 MWe steam 
and operational electricity. For this exact type of operation, the upscale potential is 56 
Mt CO2/yr in USA, and it can enable large parts of hydrocarbon or chemical plant 
emissions to be captured. Operations captured 1Mt/yr by 26 June 2014 (DoE, 2014). 
The CO2 is sold and is transported by a 159km pipe to the Hastings field CO2-EOR, 
where additional oil of 1.6–3 Mbbl/yr is produced by Denbury. This is a good example 
of a USA operation where federal and/or state grants or tax breaks are awarded to help 
neutralize the additional costs of CO2 capture and storage, by connecting them to the 
profitable benefits of very large-scale use of CO2 by EOR.  
 
(v) Iron and steel: retrofitting, or changing the process  
 
Process industries as a group account for about 25 per cent of global CO2 emissions. 
Iron and steel refining and manufacture are responsible for about 6 per cent of global 
CO2 emissions. To show how established methods are very difficult to retrofit on 
process industries, whereas new methods are more effective, this section contrasts two 
methods of making iron and steel.  
 
China produces about half of the newly made iron globally, emitting about 1.5Bnt CO2 
in 2012. An example of an established process, and the difficulty of reducing emissions 
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is the east China Caofeidian steel plant (GCCSI, 2015a), sited on the coast about 200km 
south-east of Beijing. This produces about 16 MtCO2/yr from 8 Mt/yr steel production. 
Capture of CO2 from several stages of the process needs installation of amine retrofit 
equipment at different parts of the plant. Multiple types of capture equipment would be 
needed, because CO2 arises at different localities in the process at very different 
temperatures and concentrations between 15 and 30 vol per cent CO2. The CCS project 
needs income, potentially from selling its captured CO2 for local EOR in the Jidong 
Oilfield onshore of Bohai Bay. But this CO2-EOR market needs to be created. The 
break-even price for purchase of CO2 for EOR to fund capture at the steel works would 
be around $50/tonne. In summary, a retrofit could be achieved, but is complex and 
costly, requiring synchronous development of, and fitting and operating of, complex 
processes in the plant, combined with a step change upwards in the user market for CO2 
which would need to be secure for several decades ahead. 
 
Alternatively, the Emirates Steel plant at Abu Dhabi shows how a wish to decarbonize, 
combined with the ability to invest, can drive a complete switch from an established 
process. An abundant local supply of natural gas exists, at very low cost, with decades 
of future availability. That will enable Emirates Steel to refine steel from iron ore at its 
Mussafah steel works in a way entirely different from traditional blast furnaces. The 
methane gas is used as a reagent to reduce iron ore, while the methane is oxidized to 
CO2. That makes for easy separation, in just one step, of 95 per cent pure CO2, with 
minimal energy penalty, by condensing water vapour. The project was first publicized 
in 2007, and aims to capture 800,000 tCO2/yr, at a cost of £80m in construction, cited as 
$123m costs in 2015. Again in this project, selling CO2 for EOR is a method of paying 
for the cost and operations. The CO2 will be piped about 40km, to a group of established 
large oilfields, which create multiple decades of demand. The project is scheduled to 
start up in mid-2016. 
 
 
(vi) Negative carbon: air capture  
Assessments of future global temperature and climate by IPCC (2015) climate models 
show that most predictions require ‘negative emissions’ to maintain global climate 
within 2°C warming. After the Paris CoP21, aspirations of a 1.5°C warming limit are 
expected to make more urgent the requirement for withdrawal of already emitted CO2 
from the atmosphere. Either of these 1.5 or 2°C warming scenarios will require ‘net-
zero’ emissions from 2050, so that the carbon stock emitted into atmosphere does not 
increase. There are three leading methods for negative emissions: (i) engineered 
recapture from air—which requires CCS if the carbon is stored rather than re-emitted by 
CCUS (carbon capture, use, and storage); (ii) surface carbon stock increase—
afforestation or soil re-carbonization (biochar); and (iii) biomass combustion or 
gasification with CCS. The methods with permanent geological storage ((i) and (iii)) 
require less maintenance to guarantee storage integrity (Haszeldine and Scott, 2014; 
Scott et al., 2015). 
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Air capture is an emerging technology suite, often linked to climate engineering. There 
are numerous rival methods, with major claims for their effectiveness, with claimed (but 
not verified) costs of $27–136/tCO2. Capture methods include mineral capture by water 
of crystallization, adsorption into resins, or hydroxyl cation exchange cycles. All suffer 
from the need to contact immense quantities of atmospheric air, in order to extract from 
extremely dilute concentrations. All suffer from the need to find methods to regenerate 
the capture material with minimal energy input. And none has tackled the problem of 
how to securely store the captured CO2. Based on prior research by the US Navy, some 
projects are attempting to synthesize artificial hydrocarbon fuels. In 2016 ClimeWorks 
expect to commercially offer CO2 from air, converted to hydrocarbons by established 
Fischer Tropsch synthesis, at a cost of €1.50/litre without tax, which is similar to fossil-
derived fuel including tax. If further research can develop these processes to reduce 
costs, then a ‘circular economy’ could re-use the existing carbon stock and displace the 
continuing extraction of additional fossil carbon from underground. At present, fossil 
carbon remains at extremely low cost for the energy contained, and air capture still has a 
long way to go on cost reduction and size scale-up.  
Many engineers believe and calculate that air capture is extremely expensive, especially 
compared to capture from concentrated streams of CO2 at power plants or in industry 
(Ranjan and Herzog, 2011; Brandani, 2012). A review of technologies remains sceptical 
about true system costs, placing them at $250–$1,200/tCO2 captured, for energy alone, 
with an additional capital cost to build of $600/tCO2 (Ranjan and Herzog, 2011). There 
is much scope for innovation and research to improve the technology of air capture and 
very greatly reduce costs. After that, work will be needed to understand how the 
captured CO2 can be stored. And if that is by geological-style CCS, then there also 
needs to be factored in the energy and money costs of pressurization for transport of 
CO2, pipeline costs, and demonstrating a secure injection site where CO2 can be 
monitored. 
 
(vii) Biomass CCS methods, Decatur Illinois  
 
Biomass has been included in recent IPCC models, as a means of burning fuel and 
generating heat without releasing fossil carbon. The implicit concept is that an important 
new set of activities will develop. Energy crops will be grown, harvested, and 
transported to power plant sites where the biomass will be thermally converted to 
energy by combustion. However biomass with no CCS applied is considered to be 
carbon-positive, i.e. emitting more CO2 in the decades-long life-cycle needed to replace 
biomass carbon which has been rapidly burned without consideration of the time needed 
for re-growth. (IEA-GHG 2014, Figure 4; Smith et al., 2016). It appears that biomass 
use without CCS is counter-productive in emissions. 
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Big issues for biomass are: the competition for land use with ecosystems and with food; 
water supply, and soil nutrient depletion; authentication of provenance; the technology 
and cost of CO2 capture. The harvesting, transport, energy conversion, and capture 
methods vary greatly, as biomass feedstocks are extremely complex. For post-
combustion capture the costs are stated to be similar to those from fossil fuel 
combustion, but this has not yet been applied at large scale. By contrast, gasification of 
biomass produces a much cleaner flue gas, which makes separation reliable at lower 
cost. However, these technologies are not yet reliably scaled up to the demands placed 
upon their commercial reliability and cost in an electricity supply market.  
 
Much easier, and lower cost, capture from biomass can occur when conversion is not 
combustion, but fermentation for ethanol production, or anaerobic digestion of non-
wood biomass. The ethanol plant operated by Archer Daniels at Decatur, Illinois is a 
good example of successful industry CCS from bio-ethanol manufacture. The Illinois 
Basin—Decatur Project is supported by the US Department of Energy (DoE), and 
during 3 years has captured and injected 1 MtCO2 on-site for storage into a deep saline 
sandstone (NETL, 2012). A follow-on project, Illinois ICCS, will cost $207m, about 
half supported by DoE, and will scale up to double daily injection rates of 0.9 MtCO2/yr 
(Gollakota and McDonald, 2014).  
 
 
 
IV. What net-zero carbon means 
 
This section explains that the required actions from policy on decarbonization are 
becoming much more onerous through time. In 1979 the first conference on world 
climate took place, with a goal to limit the rate of CO2 release into the atmosphere. But 
it was not until 2015 at CoP21 in Paris that a joint global agreement of 195 countries 
made a commitment to keep global warming ‘well below’ 2°C forever into the future, 
and to pursue attempts to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C. The agreement is 
voluntary, but nations are asked to report their progress each 5 years, to assess changes 
or progress. The actions have no established means of delivery. The commitment on 
temperature means that the rate of CO2 emissions is not important. A ‘net-zero’ balance 
of emitted CO2 and stored CO2 is required. Either hydrocarbon extraction must stop, or 
CCS and NET are required for a cost-effective steady-state global climate. 
 
This means that a very important difference in 2015 is that the science focus of the 
CoP21 agreement has changed from reducing the rate of CO2 release, to a finite limit on 
the total stock of carbon held in the atmosphere. That is because it is now clear that the 
rate of release of ‘carbon’ as CO2 into the atmosphere is extremely rapid on a climate 
timescale, whereas the natural processes of removal of ‘carbon’ are relatively slow—
including for example rock and soil weathering, dissolution into ocean surface waters, 
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and incorporation into biomass. This total carbon stock includes all of fossil fuel carbon, 
land-use, and soil carbon, and also includes deforestation carbon.  
 
This concept can be described as ‘net-zero’, where one tonne of carbon released is 
balanced by one tonne of carbon from the atmosphere sequestered, re-captured, or 
stored (Allen et al., 2009). Thus the goal in 2050 is no longer to reach a reduced rate of 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use (Figure 1), but to balance emissions from fossil fuel, 
carbon feedstock, and biomass utilization, by CO2 capture and geological storage; re-
capture and utilization or storage; or storage into soil, weathered minerals, or ocean. 
This balance has to be continued into the indefinite future.  
 
Utilization of CO2 is being, and will be, claimed as a commercially viable alternative to 
expensive storage. However these are economic constructs to create saleable products 
from a capture plant, these are not viable sequestration mechanisms for the required 
environmental timescales (Scott et al., 2015). A very few utilization methods may be 
able to store CO2, e.g. EOR, biochar and soil carbon, mineral weathering, or magnesia 
cement. Many other methods (forestry, horticulture, plastics, fertilizer) need to be 
excluded from financial or policy rewards for sequestration, unless carbon storage can 
be clearly guaranteed for centuries. 
 
The bad news is that an immediate and continuing challenge for political science, policy 
analysis, and practical economics, is how to develop, scale up, deploy, and mandate 
innovative actions such that technologies, taxes, and transactions become embedded as 
net-zero carbon, without damage to established economies. The good news is that 
multiple high-level analyses since 1979 claim that the cost of this carbon transition is 
just 2 per cent of global GDP. Or to make a European analogy, the UK national 
electricity system can be decarbonized for an increased bill per household of less than 
one-fifth of a middle-class household spend on Christmas. 
 
For CO2 storage to be effective in a net-zero balance, the timescales of storage need to 
be very long in human time (many hundreds to tens of thousands of years) and security 
of storage needs to be highly predictable (e.g. less than 1 per cent return to atmosphere 
in 1,000 years). These CCS and NET stores, security, and economic hierarchy effects 
are semi-quantified by Haszeldine and Scott (2014) and Scott et al., (2015), and many 
of the NET limits to land-use, biophysical impacts, and high-level economics are 
modelled by Smith et al. (2016). The capacity limits to storage, and the biophysical 
limits to resources mean that neither CCS nor NET are open-ended actions. The amount 
of commercial fossil carbon reserves to 2050 may be possible to balance by CCS, NET, 
and storage, but that leaves a zero carbon budget thereafter. Consequently, a smart 
transition will immediately and in parallel decrease the rate of utilization of fossil and 
biomass carbon emissions, while investigating the anticipated storage availability to 
balance emissions for decades to hundreds of years ahead. Either extraction of fossil 
fuels plummets, or carbon capture and re-capture technologies are used. This could be 
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the start of the end for the extractive fossil fuel energy era. But lobbying by established 
business interests is likely, from all historical precedents, to delay the transition. 
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Figure 1: Goals for the capture and storage of CO2 by industry, 2015–50  
 
 
 
 
Source: Re-drafted from IEA (2013). 
 
Figure 1, redrawn from the IEA CCS Roadmap (IEA, 2013), shows an increased rate 
per year of CO2 capture and the split between energy and industry technologies. 
According to the IEA, CCS by 2050 is expected to contribute about 13–20 per cent of 
CO2 reduction actions globally, along with fuel use efficiency, switching from coal to 
gas, renewable electricity generation, and nuclear power. The 2050 capture and storage 
rate is projected to be about 7,500 Mt CO2/yr; in 2015 it is 40Mt CO2/yr (GCCSI, 
2015b). 
 
 
 
V. Policy to deploy CCS—some success, mostly failure 
 
Fossil fuels are the best source of stored energy available to humans and so have been, 
and are, exploited as the basis of most energy needs. CCS, by contrast, is not a 
technology group which supplies energy—it consumes energy and costs more. The 
purpose of CCS is as a route which could enable fossil fuels to continue being used, but 
without the disbenefits of emissions. What then can drive the installation of CCS? 
Examining past and current policy actions on CCS from the USA, EU, and UK shows 
that none has been effective, and new radical policy innovation is suggested. The 
challenge then, is to design government actions, such as markets, taxes, and financial 
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incentives, which both create innovation in CCS and NET technology, and 
simultaneously act to incentivize construction of projects at large commercial sizes, 
while also keeping energy prices low for citizens and (allegedly) avoiding technology 
choices by government. These are incompatible aims, and require compromises for 
‘second best’ solutions, and/or acceptance of multiple market failures. These are not 
new effects, Grubb and Ulph (2002) discussed very similar issues in the interaction of 
technology, energy, and environment. Their central conclusions are still important to the 
present situation with CCS: environmental policy alone does not necessarily lead to 
major relevant innovation, technology policy is also needed; commitment by both 
government and business is essential; innovation of large changes takes a long time and 
requires learning-by-doing to inform businesses. 
 
 
(i) Europe: emission certificates and trading 
 
Famously in 2005, Europe created Emission Allowances, as certificates within a cap-
and-trade system covering 45 per cent of EU emissions. These are permissions to 
pollute, given tonne by tonne of CO2 discharged. Initial allocations of emission 
certificates were distributed across European states; these allocations systematically 
become smaller over the years, and 40 per cent are now auctioned. Consequently a 
market is created where emitters of CO2 become short of certificates and progressively 
need to purchase permits, at an ever-increasing price. A crossover will occur when the 
price of purchase is greater than the cost of equipping with capture, transport, and 
storage of CO2.  
 
This is a purist economic solution. It is technologically neutral, and will discover a 
least-cost route from the options available. The EU emissions trading system (EU-ETS) 
is regarded as a success, with 2020 emissions being 21 per cent less than 2005, and 
2030 emissions expected to be 43 per cent less. The problem is that introducing a new 
technology like CCS needs all of deployment, plus development, plus innovation. The 
pure EU-ETS instrument is too general across the economy, and is insufficiently priced 
to produce and sustain development and innovation in large-scale technologies which 
will take decades to develop. Consequently deployment has not occurred, because 
construction of the first CCS projects is both big and expensive, requiring a high price 
per tonne of carbon. One concentrated big project cannot be funded from the dispersed 
receipts of economy-wide emissions permits—these receipts need to be aggregated 
together. CCS projects take 5–10 years to plan and permit, hence these also require 
prolonged support through multiple government cycles. This means that CCS is more 
difficult than established decarbonization options which can be built at smaller size 
(cheaper per project) and operate immediately. 
 
Both photovoltaic (PV) solar and NOx scrubbing required 20–50 years to reach 
acceptable market prices. To incentivize CCS as a new technology which is only slowly 
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emerging and developing, actions specific to that technology are needed. If the EU-ETS 
market functions correctly, then CCS will not be built before a critical emissions price is 
reached, with foresight of highly probable sustained prices into the future. That does not 
provide adequate signals to drive private-sector investment into a new industry and 
drive cost reduction by serial construction for 10 or 20 years. Consequently there have 
been appropriate levels of European tea and biscuits, coffee and croissants, but zero 
effective steel and concrete.  
 
In 2009 it was recognized that the EU-ETS alone would not work. It would be necessary 
to invest in development, deployment, and innovation of CCS technologies outside the 
power and industrial products markets, while enabling the lower-carbon CCS power and 
products to be sold into the market. A second attempt at this was to allocate European 
Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) funds—economic restructuring grants—as 
capital to pay for construction costs of electricity plant. Six CCS projects were part-
funded around Europe; however, these required additional funds from the power 
companies and from member states. The power companies found that receiving farming 
renewable energy incentives was more lucrative, and the member states simply found 
cheaper priorities. Even if capex had been pulled together, the opex costs of a CCS 
operation to bridge the price gap between established dirty products, and new cleaner 
products requires £400–600m per year for a 400MW power plant. Only the UK (see 
below) has adequately considered payments for running costs to CCS. A third European 
attempt was made using the New Entrants Reserve (NER 300), i.e. the dormant 
allowances of the EU-ETS. This plan gathered together unallocated European emissions 
allowances to enable a donation of a fixed quantity of dormant allowances to CCS 
power projects. Since those allowances would not be needed (as CCS does not emit 
CO2) they would be sold by the CCS project to provide capital and operational funds. 
Even with this subsidy, additional funding guarantees were required from member states 
(ensuring cooperation). But the market price of European Allowances collapsed because 
the number of European Allowances released into the EU-ETS was over-supplied 
during the economic recession. So rather than an NER 300 award being €1 billion with 
highly priced European Allowances, it became €200m, as a consequence of lower 
priced European Allowances. As a final coup, the renewables industries successfully 
lobbied to gain access to the NER 300 fund; and managed to gain co-funding to win 80 
per cent of the finance. No CCS projects were built. 
 
In a fourth attempt, the business-led ZEP (2015b) has created an ‘Executable Plan’, 
which aims to help CCS emerge with ‘strong political direction, the right funding 
mechanisms and a robust investment environment’. This points out that the benefits to 
Europe of including CCS are estimated at €2–4 trillion up to 2050 for the energy sector 
alone, and that the core industries of cement, steel, and, especially, chemicals require 
CCS to escape punitive costs under EU-ETS. The plan decouples capture from transport 
and storage, so that a market-maker can purchase CO2 from power and industry owners, 
and resell to regional transport and storage operators. This removes the risk of a capture 
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operator being liable for storage. The anchor projects to establish regional hubs will be 
funded through the EU Innovation Fund (similar to, but with 25 per cent more 
allowances than, the NER 300), which will pay capex and opex. 
At best, these actions could create two or three CCS projects across Europe by 2020. 
There is no ring-fenced programme to develop and pull though reduced cost capture or 
CCS technology—CCS must continually compete for funds with rival low-carbon 
energy technologies. Recent history shows that renewables in Europe are altogether 
more ‘popular’ than CCS, so winning each and every funding contest is unlikely to 
succeed. That contrasts with the much more structured and systematic 
internationalization of Airbus, for example, where EU governments provide 33 per cent 
of funds through low-interest 17-year loans. And contrasts again with the USA DoE, 
where a three-phase plan of 10–20 years is supported by billions of dollars of 
government funding to ensure that multiple CCS technologies are invented, pulled 
through, trialled, and commercialized. European development of CCS is very unlikely 
to succeed by these methods. 
 
(ii) USA: legally enforced emissions performance, plus technology development 
 
The USA has chosen an entirely different method on its pathway towards 
decarbonization. In contrast to Europe, the USA is hampered by a deep and perennial 
schism in its political leadership. The concept of global change, warming, and sea-level 
rise driven by human activity has been continually and deeply resisted by many 
Republican politicians. In the USA system this has often meant that the President and 
elected members have had opposed agendas, with no agreement to act. Faced with that 
in the past on power plant sulphur emissions, or on motor fleet emissions, the USA has 
taken a legal route by creating and enforcing product standards. Both of those 
environmental clean-ups have been successful, although requiring tens of years for the 
changes to penetrate the industrial fleet. From 1970 to 2014, emissions of six air 
pollutants have dropped by 69 per cent, against a tripling of GDP and doubling of 
energy use. 
 
For CO2 emissions, the US President is taking executive action, using a legal route 
through the Clean Air Act. This ‘Clean Power Plan’ enables the USA to protect its 
citizens against excess CO2 in the atmosphere. CO2 in excess is labelled a pollutant, 
unlike the European position. This is producing a contest between legislators and 
incumbent industrialists. There is an attempt to mandate carbon capture and storage on 
power plants legalistically, in forms which will resist recidivist push-back. The 
instrument invoked to do that is an Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) on power 
plant which has to be met from summer 2020, but the means is not specified. The EPS is 
complex in its detail, administered by the Environment Protection Agency, with targets 
negotiated state by state. The EPS is imposed on new coal power plant, and if successful 
will be extended to new gas power plant. When the method is adequately established on 
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new power plant, the Clean Air Act enables EPS standards to be applied to existing coal 
or gas power plant, thus enforcing retrofits. This aims to reduce emissions from power 
plant by 32 per cent below 2005 levels, by 2030. 
 
To ensure that CCS technology is available in the USA, in contrast to Europe, the US 
DoE has allocated multiple billions of dollars (currently about $500m/yr) since starting 
with $10m in 2000, to support a coherent suite of work to support CCS on power plant 
and on industry until at least 2025. This is a multi-year programme of research, 
development, and deployment, which develops co-funding between industry, university, 
and government. It plans systematically to innovate, develop, and establish the 
technology of carbon capture at reduced costs, and also to create working examples of 
full-chain developments, from capture through transport to subsurface storage. Judged 
by numbers of research propositions, by publications, and by current and imminent 
operational commercial-size projects which have stored 11 Mt CO2, this DoE strategy is 
creating wide and deep capacity for innovation and development across the USA. To 
pull those innovations into commercial developments, now requires a pathway and 
pipeline of commercially developed projects. That will be created by the commercial 
desirability of building new power plant which can meet EPS regulations. A failsafe 
measure of enacting this strategy now is taking advantage of the unanticipated access to 
lower carbon shale gas fuels which have become available in the USA since 2000. 
Emissions reductions are already being achieved, initially by commercially driven fuel 
switching from coal to cheaper gas. However at least five commercial CCS projects are 
expected to operate by 2020, meaning that USA innovation support and deployment is 
successfully on track. 
 
 
(iii) UK: competition, markets, and carbon pricing 
 
The UK recognized in the 1990s that climate change is a long, slow challenge which 
threatens global disruption, and so requires a serious long-term response. The Climate 
Act 2008 has been passed, binding the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change to decarbonize 80 per cent from 1990 emissions across the whole economy, by 
2050. That number was based on a report published by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (2000), which derived a connection between 550 ppm CO2 
emissions and 2°C warming from the IPCC’s second report.  
 
The UK also wishes to decarbonize at a low and effective cost and will start with 
electricity. This will be achieved by creating a market setting where government can 
encourage multiple styles of decarbonization, which mutually compete to produce 
lower-carbon electricity at a low price. CCS has eventually to bid into that market of 
nuclear, gas, and renewable power suppliers. Industry decarbonization received minimal 
attention until 2013. 
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Instead of operating a technology development programme, the UK decided to move 
directly to full-scale CCS power plant. A CCS competition was created, where 
developers would work closely with government and submit bids to receive a share of 
£1 billion capex support, plus a premium electricity price as opex support for 10 or 15 
years. This system acts as a type of feed-in tariff, so could support CCS power plant 
construction and operation. But it requires continual and complex interaction with 
government. The original justification (2003–10) for such large-scale government 
investment was that the UK could be a first-mover and gain a pre-eminent position as a 
vendor of CCS equipment and design services globally, including to China. Since 2005 
and up to late 2015, three cycles of CCS bidding have now run. The first CCS project 
was volunteered to the government by BP—the Peterhead to Miller project, which failed 
to gain a government decision on funding; the second and third CCS projects offered to 
government have been under the £1 billion competition rules. About 17 different CCS 
projects have been proposed, four have undertaken detailed and expensive FEED 
evaluations of engineering design and costing. All have failed to win government 
approval. The expressed reasons have revolved around high cost, business complexity, 
and allocation of risk liability. It is now, perhaps, more clear that although CCS science 
research and invention is strong in the UK, CCS technology development does not have 
a large or well-connected support system such as that in the USA, China, or Canada. A 
commercial pay-off for UK manufacturing and design has become very much less than 
first proposed. About £500m has been expended, 70 per cent by commercial companies. 
Ironically, that could have funded the first commercial CCS project.  
 
Although a competition for procurement process may be a solution applicable to an 
established technology in a functioning electricity market, this does not work for 
emerging CCS in solving what is a technology innovation, development, and 
demonstration programme. It is as much a mismatch of skills and pace, as is a Formula 
1 racing driver in a 24-wheel truck. The competition process suffers from multiple 
difficulties. First, the development of early projects is in close cooperation with 
government, which makes these vulnerable to requests to add additional safety or extra 
high-quality back-up, i.e. over-engineering. Exactly as with the Longannet CCS project 
in the UK, if 15 per cent cost is added to each step, then it is inevitable that the total 
project can cost 80 per cent more than necessary (Haszeldine, 2012, Figure 3). Second, 
the low-emission gains, which are attractive for a power plant developer, are not 
matched by the skills, risk, and long-duration liability for a transport and storage 
operator, or for a government. Third, the protracted process of bidding and engineering 
design, extending over many years, makes these projects subject to changes in 
companies, or external events, leading to cancellation. Fourth, close links to government 
create exposure to short-term and long-term changes in government policy and attitude, 
leading to changes of confidence and sentiment. Fifth, it is hard to produce economies 
of learning—through project development pipelines, or serial builds, or to offer 
developers multiple projects—because projects proceed one at a time. Sixth, UK 
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government planning by Treasury extends a maximum 5 years ahead, with major and 
fundamental review points intervening. Each review point is a hazard.  
 
The above comments were written before 25 November 2015, which was the date of the 
government 5-year spending review. The Treasury abruptly, and without warning, 
withdrew the election manifesto commitment of just 3 months before for a ‘ring-fenced’ 
£1 billion capex prize. The two competition bidding groups, White Rose and Peterhead 
Goldeneye, were left with losses estimated to be £50m each. At the time of writing, the 
medium-term outcome is unclear. The initial reaction is that ‘political risk’ in the UK 
outweighs all others, and that lack of trust makes it impossible for major investment in 
low-carbon energy to engage with the UK, without very explicit and guaranteed 
contracts in advance. At the root of all this is the UK treatment of CCS as an energy 
provision technology which can be procured as a single high-cost item, in price 
competition against multiple lower-cost modules of better-improved low-carbon energy 
provision. That will always be unwinnable. By contrast, in this article, it is proposed 
that CCS has a much wider and deeper application to a net-zero carbon economy—
deployment could be valued not as energy, but through environment and development 
sustainability, or citizens’ health, as in the USA. 
 
 
(iv) A new economic method: zero charge certification of carbon storage, to 
balance extraction 
 
Two types of major problems underpin all of the above actions and their varying 
successes and failures. First, radical and deep carbon emissions reduction by 90 per cent 
requires actions wider than those of the electricity industry alone—the EU-ETS covers 
only half of carbon emissions, and certificates for industrial processes are often waived. 
Unless extraction of fossil and bio-carbon is completely halted, then limiting warming 
to 2°C–1.5°C in perpetuity requires that extraction is balanced by storage across all 
these sectors (Allen et al., 2009), and extends into NET as well. Second, most nations 
do not have the finance to subsidize large technology development, and will take on 
only minimal risk liability. How can investment be driven to develop improved capture 
and storage, without government expense? Additionally, an investor’s horizon in a large 
capital cost investment or venture is 20–30 years, whereas the timescale for an elected 
official or whole government is less than 5 years. And in the UK, ‘no government can 
bind its successor’ except by law, which is spectacularly unhelpful for investors. 
 
As stated by Grubb and Ulph (2002), it is necessary to join together markets, policies, 
government, and business for many years to remove and store CO2 in sufficient 
quantities to limit environmental damage. CO2 emissions need to be stopped, or allowed 
and balanced with certainty by storage, across the whole economy—not just electricity. 
A mechanism is needed which directly acts to achieve the desired objective, which is to 
ensure that CO2 produced becomes CO2 stored. At some point, all emissions need to be 
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balanced or overbalanced by storage of carbon. That point is expected to be around 
2050. How can carbon storage be enacted by multiple individual nations, in such a rapid 
timescale, while also engaging business and funders, and remaining resilient against 
future changes? 
 
There is a disconnect between organizations which produce carbon (coal, oil, gas, 
biofuel companies), and those who use carbon (industry, business, travel, citizens). The 
present system tries to penalize carbon users, but releases carbon producers from any 
responsibility for the clean-up of their product wastes—which are routinely discharged 
into the common global atmosphere. All citizens suffer a detriment to the public good. 
This does not happen in other energy or environmental sectors—the polluter pays. Why 
should carbon energy be different? 
 
The proposal is to link extraction to storage. The skills and the commercial interests of 
carbon extractors coincide well with those of carbon storage. Under present regimes, 
attainment of emissions standards or purchase of emissions certificates can be seen as 
‘compliance’ issues. The linkage of extraction to storage is intended to imply that 
storage becomes as much of a central core business interest as carbon extraction is now. 
To achieve net-zero from 2050, it is necessary to create a link between CCS reducing 
emission rates, and the future need for NET, to reduce the stock of emitted carbon. 
Addressing emissions and re-capture through the currency of carbon will enable a 
pathway to be navigated along a national or global carbon budget to 2050 and beyond; 
this can be a durable multi-decade system with governments and businesses in 
partnership. The linkage does not conflict with existing systems of EU-ETS cap-and-
trade, or with emissions performance. A no-value certificate focuses on the outcome, 
not on creating trading between dealers or governments. 
 
The core concept (Figure 2) is the creation of a certificate of carbon extraction which 
has no monetary face value, but carries an obligation to store part or all of the carbon 
extracted (Allen et al., 2015). Each tonne of fossil or bio-carbon production is allocated 
a certificate by its originating government. If carbon is imported (coal, oil, gas biomass), 
then the receiving government unilaterally allocates a certificate to that carbon with 
liability held by the importer. That means that certificates can arise in different 
jurisdictions, and are not dependent on a united global movement. The certificate is not 
an import tariff, as there is no monetary value; it is an audit of environmental security. 
The users of the carbon are not liable for storage of resulting CO2, that liability is 
retained by the original extractor, or by the importer. The government of the state where 
the carbon is used—as combustion, fuel, heat, process, or manufactured products—
imposes a storage obligation on to the certificate holder. That obligation will start small, 
maybe just 0.25 per cent of state annual carbon (e.g. storing 1.2Mt annually of 500Mt 
UK CO2 in 2020), but is intended to rise to become in line with the storage rate required 
to meet the global net-zero carbon budget (e.g. storing 500Mt/yr of UK CO2 by 2050). It 
is important that the increase of storage is understood, impartial, and resilient against 
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government and policy changes (Otto et al., 2015). Thus the trajectory will be modified 
by feedback from globally agreed values of climate measurements established from 
moving multi-year averages, so that the time of arrival at net-zero is determined by all 
global actions—if less carbon is extracted and converted, or if global heat retention and 
temperature warming is less than expected, then less CO2 storage is needed.  
 
The region of storage can be defined by a state, but must be reliably verifiable. For the 
UK, storage can be within the European Union. This may create a border adjustment at 
national boundaries within the EU. But that is again an environmental remedy, and so is 
not a business tariff barrier. The ability to make bilateral contracts transferring CO2 
across borders is already established. 
 
The storage obligation certificate creates new business. Predictable multi-decade 
timescales avoid disruption to businesses, and create opportunity for innovation into 
reliable marketplaces. Services to store CO2 are created by new companies. The 
extractors or importers do not need to store their own precise CO2 tonnage, but can pay 
a services company to store an equivalent tonnage. To that extent, there is a market—
carbon extractors or importers are incentivized to seek out the least-cost, reliable 
provider of secure long-term storage. If a certificate holder defaults on their obligation 
to store CO2, then the state can identify those certificates, and levy a penalty fine 
sufficient to pay a third-party services supplier to undertake the verified storage. The 
certificate system links simply with NET. If CCS is applied only to electricity 
generation from carbon fuels, then economy-wide decarbonization is not possible. 
Instead, to discharge a certificate obligation for storage, it is permitted to store CO2 re-
captured from NET. This still achieves the net-zero balanced budget. 
 
Why not use money and taxation? No face value means no money, means no carbon 
traders. Certificates are a lever to enforce storage, which are directly linked to the 
desired outcome, and so are impossible to escape from. This is much better than tax 
because we know from North Sea oil history since 1971 that the UK Treasury has 
placed immense taxes on oil production, but has kept the money. A trivial amount of 
money has been transferred to fund carbon storage. Forty-two billion barrels of oil have 
been produced, which has emitted about 18 billion tonnes of CO2. Approximately none 
of that CO2 has been removed and stored by the UK. Taxation manifestly does not 
incentivize storage, as politicians and the Treasury can intervene. But net-zero climate 
needs storage to operate and to balance extraction. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual flow of carbon extraction import and storage certificate 
 
 
Notes: This tags each tonne of carbon extracted within the EU, or imported into the EU, 
and awards a certificate. The certificate has no value or cost, but carries an obligation to 
store emitted carbon. The percentage of emitted carbon starts small, but through each 
year rises in line with environmental need, to store progressively more of the extracted 
carbon. Using NET re-capture and storage of CO2 is equally valid, so certificates are 
resilient and durable as a measure of net-zero balance for both CCS and NET. This 
creates certainty of storage, to limit carbon stock in the atmosphere and biosphere and 
achieve net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050. This also creates a market for storage 
providers, who develop transport and storage operations, competitively and reliably, at 
least cost. 
 
 
 
VI. Summary and conclusion 
 
CCS is not an energy-generation technology; it is an environmental mitigation 
technology. CCS applies to greenhouse gas emissions across many sectors of the 
economy. Electricity generation is frequently considered, but also heat, process 
industries, transport, biomass, and the negative emissions technologies (NET). There are 
many styles of CCS. 
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Pervasive application of CCS enables the lowest-cost transition to a low-carbon 
economy. The Paris CoP21 committed to a 2°C–1.5°C average warming limit in 
perpetuity. This means that either fossil and biomass carbon extraction is halted, or CCS 
is applied to achieve a net-zero balance of extraction to capture or re-capture and long 
duration (>104 year) storage. Short-term (102 year) carbon capture and utilization does 
not store carbon. 
 
All components of CCS exist and are proven operationally. Innovation is needed to 
overcome business and finance blockages. CO2 can be captured and stored at low cost 
from ignored industrial and business sources. International collaborations and oil 
company developers are essential. Capture processes have great potential for efficiency 
innovation leading to step-change cost reduction. Only the USA, Canada, and China are 
developing new technology, with systematic decadal programmes. A crucial aspect to 
low-cost delivery is the creation of an infrastructure system, which can transport CO2 
effectively at lower cost, and at tens of millions of tonnes per year flow rates.  
 
Environmental policies have not deployed any CCS. Wide spectrum economic actions 
have not deployed any CCS. Targeted actions are needed, linked directly to the desired 
result, which is net-zero carbon. Feed-in tariffs work, but at huge state expense. 
Emissions standards work at business expense, but may not innovate. A new proposal is 
made for carbon extraction certificates with an obligation for CO2 storage. These are 
directly coupled to the outcome, and enables connection of CCS and NET, tied to 
climate commitments. Fifteen large CCS projects exist globally, eight are in 
construction; at least 3,500 plus NET are needed by 2050. That speed is unprecedented. 
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